Since 1970 people's desire to migrate to states with favourable conditions has produced a market for passports of convenience (POCs). Tax havens and offshore financial centres (OFCs) 2 such as Tonga, Samoa, the Marshall Islands, Vanuatu, and Nauru 3 provide these, for a fee, with few naturalisation requirements. Wealthy purchasers, mostly ethnic Chinese, consider the price (up to $50,000 per head of a household 4 ) reasonable.
POCs carry tax advantages- most heavily taxed countries exempt foreigners with less than six months' residence,  purchasers avoid taxes on worldwide income, foreign exchange controls, investment and borrowing restrictions, excessive record-keeping and reporting or the frequent revalidation requirements of a primary passport,  General Motors Vice President, Michael Nyland, and family avoided massive inheritance taxes, by purchasing Tongan passports (Australian 1/1/99).
They also - facilitate entry into foreign states,  overcome travel restrictions,  provide an alternative to a cancelled, suspended or confiscated primary passport,  facilitate military conscription avoidance,  permit holders to escape identification with countries with unwelcome reputations,
Promoters contend that few, if any, purchasers will ever reside in the issuing country; and that the few who do are desirable immigrants-with substantial assets, incomes, educations and contacts. Other purchasers may come for short periods-boosting the tourism industry.
Prices vary. Some OFCs such as Switzerland, Monaco and Liechtenstein charge each head of household $1m or more. Others such as Singapore and Mauritius charge between $100,000 and $1m. PITHs target the lower middle range market-charging $4,000 to $50,000 for a household head, similar to OFCs such as Panama (Hill 1993) .
Pacific Islands' passport sales schemes raise issues of governance, with perceptions that they promote narrow interests over general welfare. Illegal sales or 'privatisation' of legal proceeds minimise the proportion of gross revenue Island governments collect. Direct or indirect sales through agents in places such as Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau benefit the privileged few in Pacific Island states. In Tonga and the Marshall Islands passport sales contribute to a new Asian dominance in local business. In many cases, particularly Tonga, public outcry has strengthened a powerful democratic reform movement--insisting that government serve majority public interests, instead of the powerful few.
All sales whether official (as in Tonga, the Marshall Islands, and Nauru) or illegal (as in The issue continues to generate conflict between forces seeking to end sales and those seeking to make them (legally or illegally). Limitation or elimination of sales may ultimately depend on deep and durable reforms in governance through stronger commitments to media freedom, transparency and democracy. PITHs apparently sold 13,950 passports raising a minimum of $153,450,000 (about $11,000 each) (see Table 1 ). Kong residents probably most favour freedom of movement (Langer 1996: 125  George Tan Soon-Gin, who handed over his Tongan passport to Hong Kong police after his Carrian group of shell companies (most in tax havens) was discovered to have fabricated hundreds of millions of dollars of profits--precipitating the colony's financial crisis of 1982 and 1983 (Asian Wall Street Journal, 30/9/96; Naylor 1994: 209-24 form of nationality originated in the idea of allegiance which a subject owes to a sovereign king (Jennings and Watts 1992: 853-4) . Many countries questioned this link's authenticity, and refused entry to TPPP holders.
TPPPs contravened the international law that prevented a state refusing right of entry and residence to its own nationals (Brownlie 2003 , Green 1987 , Jennings and Watts 1992 .
By August 1984 the US, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea refused to recognise some of these passports, although other countries (including some in Europe) accepted them (Tonga Parliamentary Bulletin 13/8/84).
The king and the aristocrat-dominated Parliament then passed the Nationality (Amendment) Act 1984-giving the king powers, and absolute discretion, to naturalise foreigners (with residence rights). About 5,500 TPPPs were allowed to expire; they had five-year lifespan, and a potential five-year extension (Tonga 1988a By 1996 Tonga had sold at least 8,447 passports 9 , but most were not renewed and expired. This paper calculates conservatively that have raised at least $92,950,000-about 6.5% of the country's gross national product each year since 1982 (see Table I ).
The Parliament in 1996 authorised the sale of a further 7,000 passports; but this paper excludes these, as they are inadequately reported. Official projections were of an additional $80m revenue. He signed an executive order ending passport sales and offshore banking schemes on 27
February 2003, while in a Washington, DC hospital for a heart condition; he died ten days later.
Before dying, President Dowiyogo gave Nauru diplomatic passports to Steven Ray and Jack Sanders (allegedly US intelligence operatives, both denied it). Ray is an American citizen, established in Washington's Republican networks. He arranged meetings between Nauru and the US on the passport and offshore banking schemes; he was appointed Nauru's honorary consul in Washington. Sanders, an unsuccessful Labor candidate for the New Zealand parliament in 1990 under the name James Thomas Stubbs, moved to China. He was made chargé d'affaires for Nauru's new embassy in China.
Reputedly Ray and Sanders were to supervise Nauru's involvement in 'Operation
Weasel'-an American plan (broached to President Harris soon after the Bali bombing)
to smuggle twenty North Korean nuclear scientists and high-level military and industrial defectors (carrying fraudulent passports) to the West through Nauru's Beijing embassy, avoiding diplomatic problems for Washington 19 . Allegedly Nauru would receive $1m for its contribution, and some private American organisations (e.g., International Law Institute) would subsidize Nauru's new missions in Washington and Beijing, for at least two years.
Opposition politicians were unimpressed with Dowigogo's American pact. Ex-President
Harris claimed that parliament did not debate the schemes' abolition properly. ExPresident, Kinza Clodumar, said Nauru had sacrificed much for an unfulfilled promise of US aid. Ray claimed that the US threatened crippling sanctions 'if known corrupting elements … regain(ed) control of Nauru's parliament' (Australian 12/4/03) and they reversed Dowiyogo's executive ban. Concern was expressed that people who profited from sales might influence the results of Nauru's election on 3 May 2003, in which the two schemes were important issues.
Ironically, Nauru's political instability was a principal reason for not using it in 'Operation Weasel'. Chinese authorities, suspicious of Sanders's activities in the country, detained him but released him because he held a Nauru diplomatic passport.
Investigations proceeded about the apparent disappearance of several hundred thousand dollars from Nauru's accounts; it was alleged that TransPacific failed to account for Tony Audoa, a former Justice Minister in Nauru, concluded that passport sales and issuing diplomatic passports to CIA-affiliated operatives had damaged Nauru's international standing and that government members, illegally receiving income from sales, had quashed police investigations. Since 1998 more than one thousand Nauru passports reportedly sold for $15,000 each. The US government was unconvinced that Nauru had stopped sales 20 . I conservatively estimate that 1,000 passports were sold for about $11,000 each-a total of $11m, averaging about 8% of the country's gross national product for each year between 1998 and 2002.
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Passport sales probably still occur. The absence or abolition of an official scheme does prevent this. Politicians and government employees may derive substantial incomes from sales and oppose democratically ratified official programmes that deliver significant revenues to the public treasury since these constrain private profits 21 . Although Samoa, for example, has strong political opposition to an official programme it appears to have the second highest number of actual sales among PITHs. Most Pacific Island passports have been sold (often secretly) by the least democratic tax havens in the region--the nearly absolute monarchy of Tonga legislated and formalised the scheme following media revelations and democratic protest, also Samoa, whose aristocratic matai system restricts democracy (Lawson 1996) . Sales were greatest in the Marshalls where Iroij (High Chiefs), and the authoritarian President Amata Kabua dominated the government.
Transparency has been the greatest threat to Pacific Island passport sales, which generally operate in secrecy. The (ultimately false) assumption that passport purchasers would not settle in the issuing country helped convince those domestic interests who benefited that the schemes could remain secret. Yet this secrecy destabilised the schemes. Exposure of hidden details by the media and by democratic interests demanding transparency, led to invalidation of many passports because (i) sales were illegal, (ii) some purchasers were notorious undesirables and (iii) secrecy concealed corruption.
The credibility of all passports issued by Tonga, the Marshalls, Nauru, Samoa and Vanuatu was damaged. Foreign countries restructured visa restrictions and innocent citizens-by-birth were harassed, refused entry or their travel was delayed. Even after metropolitan countries announced countermeasures against Pacific Island POCs many purchasers used them to enter those countries, while poorer native-born Pacific Islanders were delayed at immigration inspections.
Immigration inspectors sometimes waved through apparently rich passport purchasers, with powerful, influential friends and relatives, but delayed their poorer 'compatriots', who lack influence. Metropolitan public opinion is unlikely to be rallied against ethnic
Chinese millionaires holding Pacific Island POCs, who may spend or invest large amounts of money. The general public is ambivalent toward, and gives little support to, immigration agencies. These are often tension-riven, with divided approaches to sensitive issues--needing constant political support and pursuing opportunities to assist the rich and powerful.
Immigration inspectors make discretionary one-to-one judgements. The system is skewed toward entry, creating pressure to process many cases with minimum delay.
Immigration inspectors who minimise confrontations with apparently rich or powerful travellers improve their status. Obstructing can lead to political pressure which creates problems, which may damage the agency's image, with a consequent flow-on damaging the inspector's performance evaluation, career prospects and reputation. Admitting passport purchasers removes potentially doomed struggles with rich people and their powerful friends, whereas a crackdown on poor indigenous people, shows that the agency is 'doing something' (Gilboy 1991 (Gilboy , 1992 .
Challenges to POC schemes come from both high politics and the micropolitics of the immigration booth. At the highest diplomatic levels issuing states are accused of mismanaging their passport systems. Since sovereignty is granted by other states, it has always been conditional-limited by obligations to the 'global community' as defined by the world-system of states and, when such exists, the hegemonic state. The US, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and other countries have criticised all PITH passport sales schemes 22 . Countries such as Nauru, which sell to suspected terrorists or criminals, are seen to fail to satisfy their duties to the community of states with sales endangering other states. Australia (initially) and the US (later)
insisted Nauru terminate its scheme, arguing that its dangerous nature justified external intervention (Hindess 2002: 131-2) . Many countries oppose POCs because of national security concerns. 11 September 2001 exacerbated these anxieties. Terrorists may use
POCs to enter a country to attack it. It is ironical that Nauru officially terminated POC sales, then entered into a scheme to advance US interests regarding North Korean defectors. Probably external powers will continue using POCs in covert action (spies need false documents and identities) and in false-flag operations, where operatives use assumed national identities to divert attention from the country instigating the operation (Salter 2003: 34) . Some Nauruans felt that Nauru's involvement in a false-flag passport plan damaged its international credibility and legitimacy. Likewise, pro-democracy Tongan parliamentarians were concerned that sales to the Marcos family involved a larger plot to involve the country in dangerous international intrigues.
Pacific Islanders, believing that passport sales were illegitimate, became hostile toward immigrants, creating insoluble conflicts, at least in Tonga 23 . Community involvement in formulating the sales arrangements could have produced commitment to the processes and the durable support necessary for sustainability. Substantial proceeds and an annual tax on non-resident purchasers could fund a visible project with such as a free university or hospital (Hill 1993) . The Tonga Trust Fund (controlled by the royal family) had this opportunity, but it kept revenues overseas. The loss of most of this money in dubious investments renders this possibility unlikely.
Media scandals play an important role in promoting democratic governance and strong ethical principles; stories about ethically objectionable activities uphold social ethics.
The independent media's attentive gaze increases transparency and accountability, reducing secrecy. After exposure, continuing media attention impairs damage-control strategies-attempted cover-ups often prolong the scandal. In Tonga, the independent media support democratic governance by presenting aristocrats as vulnerable to common ethical weakness. Independent media may pursue scandals until they conclude to public satisfaction-and history providing lessons for proper governance (Lull and Hinerman 1997 POCs involve an individualistic and depoliticising classical liberal conception of citizenship-formal, legalistic and without ties to a collective identity or membership in a particular political community. POCs liberalise the passport institution itself by increasing individual purchasers' freedom, choice and powers of action. Torpey (2000: 166) argues 'Ultimately, passports and identity documents reveal a massive illiberality, a presumption of their bearers' guilt when called upon to identify themselves'. Classical liberals support unrestricted trade, and minimal government interference in migration and globalisation overturning border controls (Bhagwati 1998 (Bhagwati , 2003 A conservative notion of citizenship is defined in terms of a common, unified (and often racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic) identity without necessarily involving individual freedom or democracy. This perspective emphasises the virtues of solidarity, order and purity and opposes passport sales (see Cohen 1999) . The media generally criticise these conservative conceptions, such as those expressed by Tongans who have committed criminal acts against Chinese passport purchasers in Nuku'alofa.
The media generally oppose passport sales using democratic conceptions of citizenship connected with political participation and feelings of common destiny defined in political (rather than ethnic, cultural or racial) terms. They emphasise openness, transparency and equality. This conception has been represented most dramatically by the Tongan ProDemocracy Movement and the Vanuatu Ombudsman's Office-which the media portray as heroic crusaders.
Democrats consider that the problems presented by POCs stem from a lack of democracy and transparency. They cite statistical evidence that democratic decisions are as efficient as market decisions Shapiro 1995, Wittman 1995) and that passport sales emanate particularly from aristocratic polities such as Tonga, Samoa and the Marshall Islands. Democrats find that the judiciary can strongly oppose powerful groups and their legislature, whereas many classical liberals consider the courts as 'enforc[ing] the "deals" made by effective interest groups with earlier legislatures' (Landes and Posner 1975) .
For example the Tongan High Court, in 1988, maintained its independence and agreed with the Pro-Democracy movement in declaring the laws permitting passport sales unconstitutional-deeply offending the monarchy, the aristocrat-dominated parliament, and the powerful lobby of honorary consuls and immigration officials selling passports.
Democratic and transparent processes accommodate all parties; nobody is rejected as unworthy of information and participation. In a democratic and transparent system of governance, an issue will probably remain settled, once it is democratically decided unless a significant environmental change occurs. Non-democratic, secretive and corrupt systems never settle issues (Stiglitz 1998) . This underpins the frequent collapse of Pacific
Island passport sales schemes-leaving considerable ill feeling, recrimination and uncertainty about the status of issued passports and the disposition of proceeds.
CONCLUSION
Trust, civility, political activism oriented toward improving social welfare, and democratic consensual deliberation are the basis of long-term commitments that lower transaction costs (Green and Shapiro 1995 , Kuttner 1998 , Sabatier 1992 , Stiglitz 1998 .
Maturing democratisation acts against corruption; strong empirical evidence supports this internationally (Sung 2004) and in the US (Hill 2003) . Cheating and opportunism (with frequent misrepresentation by sellers and numerous illegal sales) generated high transaction costs. Most unlawful passports were not renewed-with subsequent losses for purchasers. There are few if any binding agreements, official covenants, iron-clad guarantees, exhaustive monitoring arrangements and efficient enforcement practices (which all minimise transaction costs) in the schemes considered here. Instead, sales have followed a pattern which historically has blocked the well-being of economies, polities, and societies world-wide. Characteristically a corrupt situation favoured elite attempts to gain revenues--without negotiating with citizens by extending greater power and democracy to them in exchange for revenues. Democratic, honest and competent governance produces competitive advantage for nation-states and is crucial to economic performance (North 1989 ). Corruption problems (in both public-to-private and privateto-private dimensions) have reportedly grown around the world with the rise of neo-liberalism and 'business politicians' since the mid-1970s--as the prevailing ideology moves from public service to maximising self-interest in an international political economy shifting toward actual (rather than the neo-liberals' 'ideal') markets (Angandona 2003 , Bull and Newell 1997 , Nelken and Levi 1996 .
Passport sales have provided an issue and opportunity for citizens in some Pacific Island states to express their support for their conceptions of nationhood, democracy, honesty and transparency in government. It remains to be seen whether this mobilisation of the people can overcome the revival of passport sales schemes that benefit a privileged few.
